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How To Be Better Prepared For A Paradigm Shift in Economic Theory, 
And Write Better Articles In The Meantime 
 
 
The history of economics as a science has seen a number of paradigmatic shifts. One might think 
of the Marginalist revolution, Keynesianism, Monetarism and New Growth Theory, to name just 
a few. Paradigm shifts are not to be relegated to the past, however. Indeed, in our time there is 
mention of a paradigm shift: for example, that economics is turning into an information 
economics (Stiglitz 2002). Subfields are also said to show paradigm shifts.  Economic geographic 
is thought to have gone through two in a very short period of time: one with the publication of 
Krugman’s 1995 book and, more recently, what the authors call a ‘reflexive’ shift (Bathelt & 
Glückler 2003). Our argument in this paper is that paradigm shifts are not like bolts from the sky. 
Elaborating on the parallel with developments in technology on the one hand, and the arts on the 
other, we argue that precursors of a shift can always be found. This is significant for 
contemporary economists, and we suggest in this short article ways that they can be prepared for 
possible paradigm shifts.  
 
1. Paradigms and Rules of the Game 
The concept of technological regime, or paradigm, has emerged as an appealing vehicle for 
studying stability and change in the field of technological and scientific knowledge (Kuhn 1962, 
Dosi 1982).3 Knowledge does not change haphazardly, so there is a need for understanding 
patterns in its development, and how and why these patterns may change. Toward this end, the 
concept of regime has received a lot of attention across the academic disciplines, and has been 
interpreted in various ways (Maasen & Weingart 2000). Within economics it has been used 
particularly in fields where the impact of technological development is a primary focus (Dosi 
1982). A technological regime is best conceived of as a set of rules or routines.4  
Rules and routines coordinate the behavior of actors vis-à-vis each other because they 
create mutual expectations and make the actions of other actors more predictable. Developments 
from within the technological/knowledge field ("push") as well as developments from the market 
("pull") may account for the regime's emergence (cf. van den Ende & Dolfsma, forthcoming). 
                                                 
3 Here, as many others do, we use the concepts of regime and paradigm interchangeably. The two may, 
however, be distinguished (Van den Ende & Dolfsma, forthcoming; Van de Poel et al. 2002). 
4 See Nelson & Winter (1982) and Rip & Kemp (1998) for examples of the productive use of this 
approach.      
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From this perspective, to say that (technological) knowledge did not "develop," is to say that 
certain rules existed that prevented or obstructed the development of the technique. This is a 
statement that needs to be substantiated by empirical evidence. The regime perspective itself can 
be seen as constraining the range of acceptable concepts. By conceiving regimes as sets of action-
guiding rules, it sees social phenomena as ultimately originating in individual human actions. 
Regimes also enable practioners to focus their attention on areas where development is expected 
to be most fruitfully pursued; not all possible directions for development are pursued with equal 
zeal.  
 One of the things that becomes clear from studies of technological regimes is that new 
regimes usually grow out of old ones.5  However, it is important to acknowledge that 
technological change does not necessarily require a regime shift or transformation; it may also 
occur within the bounds of an existing regime. An example of technological change within the 
bounds of a technological regime is the promise-requirement cycle (Van Lente & Rip, 1998). 
Promises or expectations that are shared within a technological regime will be translated into 
requirements that guide the innovative activities of the involved actors. This gives rise to 
incremental changes, in particular, but the changes may also be of a more radical nature 
(Levinthal 1998). That technological regimes have a dynamic element was explored by Nelson & 
Winter (1997, 57), who stress: 
 
 The sense of potential, of constraints, and of not yet exploited opportunities, implicit in 
a regime focuses the attention of engineers on certain directions in which progress is 
possible, and provides strong guidance as to the tactics likely to be fruitful for probing 
in that direction. In other words, a regime not only defines boundaries, but also 
trajectories to those boundaries.  
 
2. Paradigms and the Development of Knowledge in Economics 
Concerns over economists' apparent lack of interest in the history of their discipline have been 
voiced on several occasions.6 It might, however, be fruitful for contemporary economists to raise 
their awareness of the history of their own field because doing so implies going outside of, or 
beyond, one’s own paradigm. We offer three self-interested reasons for contemporary economists 
                                                 
5 See Van den Ende & Kemp (1999) on computing technology.  
6 See for example, Gordon (1965), Shabas (1992) and Reder (1999). 
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to be more mindful of the discipline's history. These reasons relate to the development of 
knowledge along paradigms.  
     First, new paradigms can take a field by surprise, obviating much knowledge that has been 
accumulated from the past. However, it must be remembered that these new paradigms are rooted 
in paradigms developed in the (sometimes distant) past, or that are developing along, or beyond, 
the profession's fringes. For radical developments in technology this has been observed by 
Levinthal (1998), who proposed the term "speciation" for the phenomenon where a piece of 
knowledge from one field enters into and is picked up in another field. In the former field this 
knowledge may have developed incrementally, but in the latter field it may cause radical changes. 
Being aware of these paradigms, understanding their focus and theoretical concepts puts one in a 
better position to be prepared for a paradigm shift. This is probably the most important reason for 
a contemporary economist to study the history of economics. In addition, because the 
development of knowledge is not (necessarily) cumulative and linear; earlier paradigms that have 
been discarded may again be corroborated (Agassi, 1975). For example, the paradigm shift 
toward a new geographical economics initiated by Krugman (1995), was not entirely new as it 
could draw on research undertaken in this field for quite some time (Martin, 1999). Thus there is 
all the more reason for economists to be more aware of the history of their field. 
A second reason is that reflecting on one’s knowledge by contrasting it with that of others 
allows one to come up with new ideas more quickly. As John Stuart Mill (1848, p.581) observed: 
 
 It is hardly possible to overrate the value … of placing human beings in contact with  
 persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those  
 with which they are familiar … Such communication has always been, and is  
 peculiarly in the present age, one of the primary sources of progress. 
 
Robert Lucas has observed this as well (REF), and others have noted that such a process works in 
teaching (economics) (Feiner & Roberts 1995, Pressman & Holt 2003) -- an observation 
consistent with psychological findings about learning (Bandura 1986).  
A third reason is that a study of the peculiarities of other paradigms makes one more 
aware of the rules of the game of one’s own paradigm. It is argued, for example, that pieces of 
music that have drawn the bulk of attention were composed mindful of, but not obedient to, the 
rules of composition (Manns 1994). It is for these reasons that the works of Mozart, Bach, Haydn, 
as well as Presley and the Beatles are still among us even as new paradigms for music have 
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emerged since these musicians composed their works (Porter 1979; Tillekens 1998). A similar 
argument holds for being able to play chess well (cf. Levy & Newborn 1991).  
     In light of the impact of rules of the game, and in keeping with Stigliz' focus on information, 
there is much to be gained from being more attentive to the often unacknowledged influence of 
language and culture on our understanding of writings in both contemporary as well as historical 
contributions to the field of economics.  In this regard, the historian Hayden White (1978) argues 
that histories are fictions, not in the sense that they are untrue, but in the sense that they are as 
much invented as found. Their forms are closer to what we find in literature than in science.   
While other of White’s works have been cited by economists (McCloskey 1985, 1990), this essay 
appears to have escaped our attention, despite the fact that it has been widely accepted by other 
audiences. White develops three concepts: myth, plot-structure, and cultural endowment. 
Together these offer interesting insights into how we read and perceive writings, which in turn 
assist our understanding the rules (routines) of the game (paradigm) in economics. 
     White describes myths as stories through which we shape our perceptions to give them 
meaning. The importance of these stories in gaining understanding is suggested by Stark (1958, 
p.105), who observes: "It is illogical to assume that we could ever know the world as it is apart 
from ourselves.  What we know we know only by and through the categories of our 
understanding" (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980).7   Accordingly, White focuses on four myth 
categories: romantic, comic, tragic, and ironic. Romantic myths are about quests, perhaps seen as 
sacred, toward a higher state of perfection or classless society. Comic myths are not about humor, 
but rather the attainment of order through evolutionary or revolutionary change. Tragic myths are 
about decline and fall, and ironic myths are about recurrent or unexpected catastrophe. 
     White acknowledges the Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye (1957) as the source of his 
myth categories. However, his position on recourse to myth in historical methodology differs 
from Frye’s in an important way.   Frye holds that patterns and generalizations should flow from 
the facts under review, while White sees them as flowing from recognizable pre-established 
themes around which facts are organized (White 1978, pp. 82-83). Their differing positions lie at 
the core of a debate over whether the outcomes of inquiries reflect clearer understandings of 
truths verifiable to anyone, or truths verifiable only to those who see the world in the same way. 
Such a debate has been engaged over how we read earlier writings on economics, and has been 
characterized as the truth v. perspective, or chronicler v. constructionist debate (Backhouse 1992). 
                                                 
7 All emphases in quotations are in the original unless otherwise noted. 
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      Plot structures are what give a story its shape. They are the elements of the story and how 
they are arranged by the author to allow the reader to understand what is being presented.  White 
states (1978, p.86): 
 
The reader, in the process of following the … account of those events, gradually comes to 
realize that the story he is reading is of one kind rather than another: romance, tragedy, 
comedy, satire, epic, or what have you. And when he has perceived the class or type to 
which the story that he is reading belongs, he experiences the effect of having the events in 
the story explained to him.  He has at this point not only successfully followed the story, he 
has grasped the point of it, understood it, as well.  
 
     What allows the reader to understand the story is that he shares a cultural endowment with 
the writer that leads to similarities in their understanding of how significant human affairs take 
form. Culture provides the context, or template, in which myths and plot structures are 
interpreted. What distinguishes one culture from another is differences in how their members 
interpret a myth or plot structure. Thus, the relationship between myths, plot structures and 
culture is interactive: how you interpret a myth or plot-structure defines the culture to which 
you belong, and if you belong to a particular culture you can be expected to interpret a myth or 
plot structure in a particular way. For example, how one reads the writings of Adam Smith or 
Karl Marx will determine whether she is more appropriately seen as belonging to a culture 
endorsing capitalism or a culture endorsing socialism, and, at the same time, belonging to one 
or the other of these cultures will influence how she reads those writings.   
 
3.  Paradigms, Myths, and the History of Economics 
 
While myth categories can be applied to economics in general, here we focus on the history of 
economic thought literature. Adam Smith's Invisible Hand and Karl Marx' economic 
interpretation of history can be read as romantic myths, each describing a quest toward a higher 
state of perfection.  For Smith, the quest is toward a fuller realization of the principle of 
subsidiarity through a reduction in the role of government. For Marx, it is toward a truly human 
society by way of a progression through epochs of the production process. The general 
equilibrium model under prefect information or Say's Law that the economy tends to full 
employment can be read as comic since each leads in an evolutionary way to an ordered outcome.  
Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction when viewed from the perspective of those 
  
 7
with a stake in the displaced technology, and David Ricardo’s prediction of shrinking capitalists’ 
incomes as production is forced onto lower quality land can be read as stories of decline and fall, 
and therefore as tragic.  The undoing of the hive in Bernard de Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees 
following the bees’ conversion from vice to honesty, and Malthus’ population theory can be read 
as irony.   
     References to plot structures and cultural endowments, although not named as such, if at all, 
are also found in the writings of economists.  Perhaps the best-known acknowledgment of plot 
structures in economics is Schumpeter's (1954, p.42), "vision."  He writes: "Analytic effort starts 
when we have conceived our vision of the set of phenomena that caught our interest....  The first 
task is to verbalize the vision or to conceptualize it in such a way that its elements take their 
places, with names attached to them that facilitate recognition..." (Emphasis added).  Building on 
Schumpeter’s ‘vision,’ and suggesting as well the role of myths, Heilbroner (1990, 1110), 
observes that: "...[B]ehind scenarios of the most differing sorts lie the precognitive analytic 
acts...that not only fulfill the essential task of reducing raw perceptions to ordered concepts [plot 
structures], but that also imbue those concepts with qualities of inevitability and rightness 
[myths]."           
     Concerning the economics profession’s having a particular cultural endowment which 
contributes to understanding, Hayek (1969, p.46), writes: “It is significant that the capacity to 
respond to signs of which we are not conscious decreases as we move from members of our own 
culture to those of different cultures."  A similar opinion is voiced by McCloskey (1990, 34), who 
writes: “An economist can read the most unreadable and compressed production of a fellow 
economist if she participates in the same community of speech.” Weir (1989) underscores this 
point by analyzing the differential acceptance of the views of Keynes in two contemporary 
cultures. Strassman (1993), Strassman and Polanyi (1995) and Feigenbaum and Levy (1995) also 
argue that the audience of economists is culturally endowed in a particular fashion. Weintraub 
(1991, p.7) takes the role of cultural endowment one step further by explicitly separating it from 
science: 
 
[W]hat constitutes a good theory...is not a matter of comparing the theory to some standard 
of scientific goodness.  We have to ask more complex questions of a theory and its 
interpretations.... We seek to understand the way the interpretive community has read the 
economy text and what makes the community more likely to respond to one interpretation 




One need not go this far to acknowledge the role of myths, plot structure and cultural endowment 
as means to understand the rules (routines) of the game (paradigm) in economics. 
These comments by Schumpeter and the others appear comfortably aligned with the 
importance White assigns to myths, plot structures, and culture; suggesting that a heightened 
awareness of the myths and plot structures employed by  writers, as well as of their cultural 
endowments, can enhance what we take away from earlier writings on economics. Below are two 
ways in which this heightened awareness can strengthen one's interaction with that literature: 
first, by allowing a more open and penetrating assessment of what has been written, and second 
by increasing the recognition that the mathematical arguments on which so much of current 
economics is based are, in fact, plot structures.  
 
Sensitivity to Differing Cultural Endowments and the Assessment of Earlier Works.  Greater 
sensitivity to differences in the cultural endowments of earlier writers and today’s reader will     
hopefully prompt the reader to make an effort to better understand the environments in which the 
writers found themselves. Thanks to this effort, today’s reader might better understand, rather 
than merely "follow," the writers’ arguments. This sensitivity and subsequent effort is important 
because an understanding of the writers’ cultures is not automatically conveyed in their writings, 
and the present-day reader is to some degree a captive of his or her surroundings. As Coats (1973, 
p.489), writes: "However sensitive his historical imagination, the intellectual historian cannot 
enter fully into the minds of his subjects, especially if they lived long ago; and however hard he 
tries, he cannot fully emancipate himself from the ideas and beliefs of his own day" (cf Boylan & 
O’Gorman 1995, p.53-4). 
     For example, the modern economist reading Malthus’ population theory should, even if tightly 
culture bound, readily follow the analytics of his argument. But since he or she cannot enter 
Malthus’ mind or be fully emancipated from today’s ideas and beliefs, the reader’s understanding 
of the motivation and reasoning underlying the theory should be enhanced by a greater awareness 
that Malthus’ society had a largely poor, wealthless and politically under-represented working 
class, prohibitions against organizing labor, and a history of laws hostile to the working class to 
the point of forbidding its members to read the Bible in English.8  
     Another example involves economic thought on property rights and the charging of interest on 
loans. Views on these issues have, in the West, and certainly among economists, changed 
                                                 
8 The 1543 English Act for the Advancement of True Religion forbade reading from the Bible by prentices, 
husbandmen, laborers, and others. (See Kastan, nd., p.16.) 
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dramatically from Biblical times. Thomas Acquinas’ influential remark that it ‘is to sell what 
does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice’ (in his Summa 
Theologica, ca.1270) stands in marked contrast with what we believe is natural today. In effect, 
the practice of lending has become commonplace, however, even in the Islamic world where 
interest may not be charged.  Or consider positions taken in statements from the Old Testament 
that property shall be returned to its original owner on the sabbatical year, a person forced to sell 
their land can reacquire it at a discount, and interest can be charged to foreigners but not fellow 
countrymen.9  Such positions might seem nonsensical to today's reader.  But for a largely nomadic 
society in hostile surroundings, as was often the case for the ancient Jews, such rules could well 
lead to more orderly (or "comic") outcomes than would more individually determined agreements 
on property ownership and lending, such as those found today. Would one’s understanding of this 
thinking be improved by a greater sensitivity to the similarities and differences between what we 
call the two paradigms (Heilbronner 1996, pp. 42-3)? We believe it would.   
     One consequence of a greater appreciation for differences between the writers’ and reader’s 
cultures is that it should make us more hesitant to dismiss earlier writings as uninformed or 
irrelevant because, on first reading, they appear inconsistent with the tenets that underlay modern 
economics. As Strassman and Polanyi (1995, p.143), explain: "...[I]n economics, stories which jar 
with the situated perspective of established practitioners...are deemed outside and irrelevant to the 
important conversations of the field."  
     Why might stories from the history of economic thought be jarring and irrelevant to the 
established practitioner?  One answer is because of the way we prioritize and present the earlier 
literature.  Consider Richard Schmalensee’s (1991, pp.115-116), speculation on the future of 
economics, which builds on Kuhn's normal science and paradigm shifts: 
 
...[M]any, if not most, of the problems on today's research agenda will be solved through 
"normal science"....  History also suggests, however, that some problems ...will be solved 
only by "paradigm shifts" and that these shifts will change both the tools economists use 
and the problems they study.  Whatever the successes that will be achieved by natural 
extensions of current lines of research, these revolutions will dominate histories of 21st-
century economic thought. 
    
                                                 




     If, indeed, we prioritize and present the history of economic thought in a way that focuses 
more on paradigm shifts than on extensions through normal science, an appreciation for the 
differences between the cultural endowments and recognizable myths and plot structures of 
earlier writers and today’s readers might well play a key role in informing our understanding of 
the earlier works. This is especially true if, as suggested by Heyne (1996, pp.2-3), what we take 
as "preanalytic visions" are in fact "postanalytic conclusions" following from study of the current 
mainstream literature. 
     A greater openness to cultural differences would, hopefully, lead us to approach the earlier 
writings with questions like: "what cultural elements make this viewpoint reasonable, even 
though it might not at first appear reasonable to residents of today’s culture"; and "once cultural 
differences are acknowledged, what can we learn from this viewpoint?"  An alternative approach 
to the earlier writings would be to use what Barber (1990, p.116), calls "selective filtration."  This 
occurs where subsequent renditions of earlier works edit out some parts while retaining others.  If 
selective filtration is the method of choice for dealing with earlier writings that appear 
inconsistent with how we currently view economics, its likely effect is to be their dismissal. 
     Thus, as we suggest, if one is able, as an economist, to explicitly grasp the rules (routines) of a 
game (paradigm), one is in a much stronger position to compose better research than would 
otherwise be the case. In addition, one will be in a better position to respond to paradigm changes.  
 
Mathematics as Plot Structure.   Heilbroner (1988, 38) writes: "Economics prides itself on its 
sciencelike character, and economists on their ability to speak like scientists, without color, 
passion, or values, preferably in the language of mathematics."  Given this self-image of 
economists, one would not expect the word "poetic" to be the first chosen to describe their 
method.  Yet, the characterization fits. White (1978, p.82), describes the poetic plot as that which 
works from, not toward, a unifying form. Certainly a poem's meter and rhyme demonstrate the 
presence of a unifying form. But the notion of unifying form goes far beyond the obvious 
mechanics of poetry.  Terms like "comprehensive" and "constructed" (as opposed to simply 
"reported"), suggest underlying forms that allow us to articulate our imaginations and come to a 
fuller understanding of that which surrounds us.  Given this definition, mathematics with its 
carefully structured and widely applicable formats, and its role in arriving at orderly 
understandings can be reasonably described as poetic. Thus, to the extent economists’ current 
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method of choice for analyzing and explaining social phenomena is mathematics, their method is 
poetic.10            
     If economists' method is poetic in the sense used here, one problem for today’s reader 
approaching earlier economic writings might be the nonmathematical format in which many of 
their arguments are cast.  Specifically, the reader might have what Hexter (1971, pp.16-17), calls 
an "assimilationist" view of the worth of earlier works, which holds that: "...'explanation'…that 
deviate[s]... from the physical-science norm [is]... either an inferior or inadequate surrogate for 
'real,' 'complete,' or 'satisfactory' explanation,…or it [is]... not an explanation at all...."11  
Ultimately, this criticism is of the form of the explanation, not its content.    
        One example of how this could affect the reading of earlier works in economics occurs 
where there is a conflict between a currently popular mathematical technique and a myth or plot 
structure underlying an earlier presentation. As background to an examination of this conflict 
consider Nelson’s (1992, pp.114-115) comment that: 
 
...the application of mathematics to problems of human behavior can come only through 
the explanation of mathematical formulas as metaphors for some real world phenomenon, 
and this drawing of analogies involves the use of words.  In the process, meaning beyond 
that immediately present in the mathematical analogy will also be suggested. 
 
More pointedly, the economist Boettke (1992, p.85), notes that "...'vision' and 'analysis' are not so 
neatly separated." 
    If, as suggested by Nelson and Boettke, mathematical techniques convey meaning beyond what 
is immediately present in their mechanics, potential conflicts are likely to surface when reading 
the history of economic thought literature.  For example, mathematical techniques for solving 
maximizing problems are at the core of a large part of modern economics.  Because of these 
techniques, one meaning likely to be attributed to maximizing behavior by the modern 
practitioner is that it leads to orderly, or comic, outcomes – which are good. While much of the 
earlier economics literature is consistent with this modern perception of maximizing behavior, 
                                                 
10  The elements used in defining "poetic" are drawn from White's discussion of Frye's views on the 
relationship of history to myth.  McCloskey (1990, p.12) speaks of models as the poetics of economics. For 
more on mathematics and form in economics see McCloskey (1985, 53; 1994, Ch. 13), and Knorr Cetina 
(1991, p.108). 




from the Aristotelian viewpoint such behavior is questionable because of its association with gain 
seeking and greed, which can prevent the attainment of higher values.  This is consistent with a 
tragic or ironic myth – which is bad.  This leaves the modern economist with a choice: Dismiss 
the Aristotelian view because it is inconsistent with how stories are plotted today (selective 
filtration again), or ask what would make the viewpoint reasonable, and what can be learned from 
the viewpoint.  But the risk of premature dismissal is not limited to our acceptance of earlier 
writings.  Modeling out-of-equilibrium dynamics is mathematically possible.12 But it is largely 
incompatible with the equilibrium-directed approach popular among economists today, and 
practitioners of each approach might not understand what the other is doing.  
     In summary, our understanding of earlier writings in economics stands to benefit from a 
greater awareness that myths and plot structures underlay the interpretation of economic theories, 
and that the economics profession is a community of inquiry with a defined but changing 
dominant view of reality that informs what its mainstream recognizes or accepts as myths and 
plot structures.  Given this, Lyotard (1984, p.7), writes: "I do not mean to say that narrative 
knowledge can prevail over science, but its model is related to ideas of internal equilibrium and 
conviviality...next to which contemporary scientific knowledge cuts a poor figure, especially if it 
is to undergo an exteriorization with respect to the 'knower.'" In fact, exactly the opposite may 
occur with the history of economic thought.  The scientific (mathematical) aspects of earlier 
theories may pass relatively easily and understandably from their writers (the knowers) to today’s 
readers possessing standard analytic skills.  What may not pass so easily are the myths and plot 
structures around which the theories were built.  
 
4.  How the history of economic thought helps us better understand paradigms 
In a 1976 article McCloskey (1976, p.454) has claimed that: 
 
 “An economist hopping around without a historical leg, …, has a narrow perspective on  
 the present, shallow economic ideas, little appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses  
 of economic data, and small ability to apply economics to large issues.” 
 
Nevertheless, from time to time one encounters the opinion that the modern economist can safely 
ignore the history of economic thought; either because the earlier thinking has been replaced by 
                                                 
12 Out-of-equilibrium mathematical modeling is undertaken in fields, for instance, that are inspired by 




better thinking,13 or it simply chronicles what was important in the past, and is therefore of little 
interest to the modern economist wrestling with today’s problems. These two arguments go by 
several names: absolutism and relativism; incrementalism and inductivism; and economic thought 
in the tradition of Walras and in the tradition of Adam Smith (Blaug 1968, pp.2-3; Houghton 
1991, pp.397-399; Fetter 1965, pp.136-137).  
     But do these arguments speak to the worth of the earlier writings, or to how we interact with 
them?  For example, and based on what we have seen from our exploration of White’s views, is 
current thinking really better, or is it just expressed in a way that is more recognizable to today’s 
economist?  While some modern theories are unquestionably superior to earlier presentations, the 
fact that names like Smith, Marx, Schumpeter, Ricardo and Keynes carry more weight in certain 
circles than do those on a short list of today’s leading economists suggests that it is presumptuous 
to categorically dismiss the earlier works as, relatively speaking, inferior.   
     Likewise, is it that the history of economic thought is just a chronicle of what used to be 
important, or is it that we might not fully appreciate the importance of what had been written 
because we are embedded in our own culture?  For example, somewhere in the world is there an 
under-represented and largely wealthless class unable to effectively politically organize or 
otherwise create an economic safety net?  If there is, can Malthus’ writing be ignored when 
considering these people because "it applies to an earlier time?"  Or now that the "Evil Empire" 
has been defeated and capitalism has reached global proportions, can we forever close Das 
Kapital? And now that education of children is generally understood as beneficial, can today's 
reader understand Jevons' position on this topic (cf. Mosselmans & White 2001)? 
      Thus, the (inescapable) presence of myths, plot structures and cultural endowments 
challenges the accuracy, and therefore the validity, of two primary avenues of attack on the 
history of economic thought. However, myths, plot structures and cultural endowments might 
create an alternative reason for modern economists to ignore the history of economic thought.  
This has to do with the history of economic thought’s potential impact on the acceptance of 
current thinking. Ramstad writes: "It is taken for granted by the neoclassical economist that there 
lies submerged within the social totality a logically separable mechanism known as the 'market 
system.'...  This presumption permits the economist to mentally dissever the economic  
sphere... from the larger entity, society."14      
    Dissevering the economic sphere allows the economist to sidestep the muddying effects of 
                                                 
13  Weintraub (1991, p.5) describes this as the attitude that economics has progressed "...from a dark and 
uninformed past to an enlightened and scientifically sophisticated present." 
14  Quoted by Whalen and Whalen, 20. 
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alternative myths, plot structures and cultural endowments on his or her inquiry.  But is this 
dissevering appropriate?  In the study of the history of economic thought, the answer is likely, 
"No." One reason is suggested by Karl Polanyi, who writes (1968, p.3): "...[P]rior to our time no 
economy has ever existed that, even in principle, was controlled by markets....  Though the 
institution of the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age, its role was no more than 
incidental to economic life." This creates a (perhaps unwelcome) opportunity for the modern 
economist to confront what Mitchell (1967, p.7), describes as "...the limitations of his knowledge, 
the fallibility of his insights, ...[and] the degree to which he is a child of his age...."   
 To the extent we are unavoidably children of our age, the literature from the history of 
economic thought challenges the generalizability of received analysis by introducing myths, plot 
structures and cultural endowments unlike those currently dominant in the profession. This 
creates a situation like that in literary analysis, as described by Michael Valdez Moses: "At 
virtually every level of analysis...the consideration of the peripheral case begins to alter our 
perception of the metropolitan one...."15 It can also be likened to Kuhn’s paradigm shift, but this 
time running in reverse - where the earlier challenges the current.  
     Unfortunately, this challenge creates an opportunity cost for the modern economist.  If part of 
the attraction of economic analysis is that it both describes and creates reality - the latter when its 
"story" is uncritically accepted as "true" - the works of earlier economists whose chosen myths 
and plot structures differ from those employed by modern analysts may present a threat to those 
analysts who have a stake in the generalizability of their own findings.16   
 
5.  Conclusion 
We have argued here that confronting other paradigms in our field of economics will increase 
your awareness of the peculiarities of your own sub-field within economics. This will: (1) make 
you better prepared for a possible paradigm shift in your field, (2) imbue your work with more 
varied ideas, thus (3) improving its quality, recognition and longevity. As Alvin Gardner 
comments: "The task of the historian of social theory is not, as is commonly thought, either to 
celebrate, to bury - or even to merely understand - the past; its task is to discomfort the present."17 
Some debate might arise over Gardner’s ranking of tasks. Certainly the history of economic 
thought, if paid attention to, should challenge or at least inform, the present; if not in its own 
                                                 
15 Quoted by Ruland, 359. 
16 Feigenbaum and Levy (2, 5) approach this issue using the theory of clubs.   
17  Quoted in Lowery (1991, p.136). 
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right, then by playing into the interests of practioners in the field of economics. Regardless of 
how one wishes to rank these tasks, the celebrating, burying or discomforting will be more 
focused and informed if it is based on greater understanding. And greater understanding should 
come from greater attention to the myths (paradigms) and plot structures (routines) used by the 
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